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Age and Experience Profiles
of Earnings
The experiments reported in the previous section were meant to
provide evidence on the extent to which the schooling model is ap-
plicable to the analysis of earnings. They indicate the need for caution
in extending the schooling model beyond the 'overtaking" subset of
earnings distributions, even for qualitative analyses. Confidence in
the validity of the schooling model as a component of human capital
analysis is strengthened, but it is necessary to turn to the post-school
phase of investment behavior in order to extend the analysis to the
whole earnings distribution.
If productivity-augmenting investments in human capital con-
tinue after the completion of schooling, the time distribution of these
investments over the working lifecreates age variation in earnings,
referred to as the age profile. In proceeding to the empirical analysis
of earnings profiles in the light of the investment model, no claim is
made, of course, that the observed age profile of an individual re-
1. My analysis does not cover the "post-retirement" stage of the life cycle. At that
stage, special emphasis must be placed on depreciation of human capital and on the
behavior of the labor supply, subjects which are beyond the scope of the present study.AGE AND EXPERIENCE PROFILES OF EARNINGS 65
flects only investment behavior. Elements of chance, of changing
market opportunities, and of biopsychological development are im-
portant. Nonetheless, there is evidence that work experience is much
more important than age in affecting productivity and earnings.I
interpret productivity-augmenting work experience as an investment
phenomenon. The assumption of costless opportunities for aug-
menting productivity, which is sometimes implied in the notion of
"learning by doing," cannot be descriptive of labor markets where
labor mobility is the norm rather than the exception.2 At any rate, the
investment interpretation lendsitself to empirical analysis. The
proper question is how well the investment model handles the data,
and whether alternative models can do better.
Given individual differences in investment behavior, earnings
profiles differ both among and within schooling groups. I study first
the typical shapes of earnings profiles of individua's at a given level
of schooling.I then inquire into differences among such average
earnings profiles of different schooling groups. Later I consider the
consequences of individual differences in earnings profiles among
persons who have the same amount of schooling.
The earnings data shown in Chart 4.1 are mean earnings in the
sample of men, by years of schooling and by two-year age intervals
up to age 40, and five-year age intervals thereafter.3 Experience pro-
files are shown in Chart 4.2. Profiles of annual and weekly earnings in
log scales are shown in Charts 4.3 and 4.4. The basic features of the
age profiles are easily summarized: except for the initial years of
gainful activity, earnings are higher at higher levels of schooling, and
increase with age through much of the working life. The absolute and,
more consistently,relativerate of increase in annual earnings
2. The argument is spelled out by Becker (1964, pp. 45—47): Greater opportunities
for learning will attract larger supplies of labor. Consequently, the steeper earnings
profiles will shift downward to intersect the flatter ones, giving rise to opportunity
costs of learning.
3. Earnings data by single-year intervals were also calculated from the 1/1,000
sample. These showed apparently erratic sawtooth patterns in the profiles, particu-
larly at older ages. This, however, should not be interpreted to mean that typical
individual profiles fluctuate erratically over the life cycle. Sample sizes for single
years of age and schooling are often quite small. They decrease with age, particularly
in higher schooling groups. The pronounced instability of the year-by-year sample
averages of earnings can be accounted for by sampling fluctuations as well as earn-
ings variances that are large and increase with age.66 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
CHART 4.1
AGE PROFILES OF EARNINGS OF WHITE, NONFARM MEN, 1959








NOTE: Figures on curves indicate years of schooling completed.
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CHART 4.2
EXPERIENCE PROFILES OF EARNINGS OF WHITE, NONFARM MEN, 1959


















NOTE: Figures on curves indicate years of schooling completed.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































diminishes with age, becoming negative, ifit changes at all, during
the last decade of working life. There is no visible decline at these
later ages in weekly earnings. Apparently, declines in weeks worked
per year are the main factor in the decline of annual earnings during
the preretirement years (cf. Table 7.2, column 3).
The differences among schooling groups are systematic: at
given ages the absolute and relative rate of growth of earnings in-
creases with schooling. Earnings level off at earlier ages in the lower
schooling groups. Since earnings reach a plateau at later ages in the
most highly educated groups, both dollar and relative annual earn-
ings differentials among schooling groups grow with age until age
45—50, and later still for weekly earnings.
The picture changes drastically when earnings profiles are com-
pared by years of work experience rather than age.4 Chart 4.3 shows
that the experience profiles of log earnings tend to converge with
growing years of experience, in contrast to age profiles, which di-
verge with growing years of age.
Logarithmic experience profiles of weekly and hourly earnings,
shown in Charts 4.4 and 4.5, are more nearly parallel, suggesting that
relative "skill" (measured by schooling attainment) differentials in
wage rates do not change perceptibly with years of experience.6
Dollar differentials do increase with experience in annual earnings,
and in weekly and hourly rates as well, though not nearly as much as
they do with age. In view of the parallelism or convergence of
4. Years of experiende start at ages indicated in column 3 of Table 3.1.
5. The degree of convergence of experience profiles of annual earnings is partly
affected by the state of the labor market, since in a recession unemployment rates
increase more among the young and unskilled than in other groups.
6.'Skill" differentials in wages are commonly measured by the percentage dif-
ference between adult male wage rates in sets of pairs of narrowly defined occupa-
tions, one skilled, the other unskilled. The choice of pairs, the definition of wages,
and the changing skill contents make the interpretation of such comparisons and of
trends in them as trends in relative factor prices rather uncertain. The often steep rise
of earnings with age suggests that differing age distributions in the occupations being
compared are another source of ambiguity in these measures. For example, an accele-
ration of upward trends in schooling raises the average age in the lower schooling and
skill groups and lowers it in the upper groups. This produces an apparent narrowing
of relative wage differentials, which may be misinterpreted as a relative price effect of
the change in relative supplies of skills. Standardization for age is not sufficient, how-
ever. As we have seen, relative wages increase with age. But my finding of near-
parallelism of the experience profiles suggests that standardization for experience
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logarithmic experience profiles, the strong increase in relative earn-
ings differentials by age must be attributed entirely to the faster rate
of growth of earnings at earlier compared to later years of experience.
Let the earnings profiles be interpreted as being a consequence of
post-school investments. Then the life-cycle or profile rate of growth
g1 of log earnings at time t is derived from the log-earnings function
(1.15) in its continuous form:
(4.1)
Assume rates of returnto post-school investment to be fixed,
and think of the ratio (ks) of investment to gross earnings as a "time-
equivalent" amount of investment incurred in periodt.Let the
second term on the right of (4.1) be either negligible or unrelated to
levels of schooling. Then the empirical findings suggest that, at
given ages, the amount of "time" people invest in human capital
increases with the years of their schooling. The longer-schooled,
however, do not spend more "time" than the less-schooled at
comparable years of experience.Indeed, the convergence of
logarithmic experience profiles means that, over the working life,
the more educated workers spend less "time" in post-school invest-
ment activities. Profiles of annual earnings converge, but profiles
of weekly earnings are parallel, and itis not clear which is more
appropriate for gauging the comparative "time" measures.7
Another interpretation of convergence is that rates of return to
post-school investment, rather than volumes, differ among schooling
groups. By(4.1)thesteepergrowth in earningsinthelowerschooling
groups may reflect a higher rate of return to post-school investments
(rg) rather than a larger time-equivalent (ks). An attempt was made to
ascertain this by deflating the observed rates of growth of earnings,
at comparable stages of experience, by the available estimates of
7. The parallelism of weekly earnings indicates that convergence of annual earn-
ings, or the margin by which less schooled persons spend more "time" in post-
school investment, arises from their lower employment levels when they are young.
To the extent that the greater discontinuity of employment of poorly educated young
men represents labor mobility—people in search of better jobs—the periods of unem-
ployment can be properly reckoned as "time" spent in investment, If, however, the
differences in employment experience between them and the more educated repre-
sent differences in length of involuntary unemployment or in leisure preferences,
"time" spent in post-school investments is overstated for the former.AGE AND EXPERIENCE PROFILES OF EARNINGS 73
TABLE 4.1
ESTIMATES OF POST-SCHOOL INVESTMENTS IN DOLLARS














0—4 $3,470 1.23 $10,120 3.78
5—7 4,430 1.26 13,350 4.27
8 4,310 1.10 13,570 3.56
9—11 6,000 1.26 14,220 3.10
12 5,920 1.05 15,420 2.68
13—15 7,550 1.09 17,270 2.46
16 8,300 1.09 30,500 3.25
NOTE:= earnings at peak; V8 = earnings at overtaking; r= rate of re-
turn.
Col. 1: C(1O—15)= (Y15— Y10)/r= dollar investments between the tenth
and fifteenth year of experience.
Col. 2: k(10—15); (In Y15— In Y10)/r= year-equivalents of investment be-
tween the tenth and fifteenth year of experience.
Col. 3:=— Y8)/r= total dollar post-school investments.
Col. 4: = (In Y,. — In Yj/r=totalyear-equivalents of post-school in-
vestments.
SOURCE: Earnings data from Charts 4.1—4.3; rfrom Table 3.1, column 9.
overall rates of return, assuming that they are similar to rates of return
on post-school investments. The results, shown in column 2 of Table
4.1, indicate that the deflated slopes decline as schooling level in-
creases, but increase mildly above the high school level.8
Table 4.1 also contains estimates of total amounts of net post-
school investment incurred by workers in each schooling group over
their working life, in dollars and 'year-equivalents" (columns 3 and
4). It can be seen that total dollar values rise with schooling, but the
time-equivalents are only weakly related to schooling. Total year-
equivalents of post-school investment calculated from estimated
wage rate data (Chart 4.5) are very similar in all schooling groups
and amount to three to four years.
8. The observed convergence may also be due to "vintage" or obsolescence
effects. Obsolescence diminishes total investment and its rate of decline over time
(Becker, Koeune). This is reflected in flatter and less concave earnings profiles, pre-
sumably at higher levels of skill (schooling).74 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
TABLE 4.2
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF POST-SCHOOL INVESTMENT COSTS




















































C3 = investment in schooling in constant dollars (thousands).
= post-school investment in constant dollars (thousands).
= post-school investment in year-equivalents.
SOURCE: Mincer (1962, Table 1 and appendix data).
In a previous study, dollar estimates of post-school investment
were calculated in a stepwise fashion by estimating instalments of
such investments (Mincer, 1962). The totals in dollars and time-
equivalents are here re-estimated from the same data, and a compari-
son of the old and new estimates is shown in Table 4.2.
The old estimates are very similar to the new at the college level,
but about half the size at lower levels, primarily because the 0—4
schooling group age profile was used as the "zero investment" base
line in the disaggregated procedure. Itis difficult to believe that
individuals in the lowest schooling group incur no post-school invest-
ments, but it may also be argued that the "no-investment" profile is
not horizontal but concave, for biotogical reasons. It is perhaps best,
therefore, to consider the alternative estimates in Table 4.2 as
bracketing the true values. This would mean, in turn, that the time-
equivalents in the table are also overstated somewhat, particularly
at the lower levels of schooling. If the time values are midway be-
tween the two estimates, the dollar volumes of post-school invest-
ment are overstated 20—25 per cent on average when a horizontal
shape is assumed for the zero investment profile.
The investment behavior inferred from the earnings profiles,AGE AND EXPERIENCE PROFILES OF EARNINGS 75
though in some respects unclear, is quite plausible in the light of
human capital theory. The logarithmic concavity of the earnings pro-
files is actually strongly implied by the analysis of optimal distribu-
tion of human capital investments over the life cycle.9
The differences among schooling groups are plausible: those
who invest more (dollars) in schooling also spend more in post-
school investments. Greater ability and better access to financing
opportunities are common factors in both forms of investment. These
factors evidently dominate whatever incentives and opportunities
exist for substitution between the two kinds of investment. As for
time-equivalent measures of investment, the cross-sectional figures
in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate a negative or zero correlation between
time spent in schooling and in post-school investments. Over time,
total schooling and post-school investments grew in dollar terms.
However, schooling expenditures grew more rapidly than expendi-
tures on post-school investments (compare C8 with in Table 4.2).
The growth of public subsidies to education may have been an im-
portant incentive for substituting schooling for job training. In time
units, this substitution accelerated the upward trend in years of
schooling and reduced somewhat the time spent in job training.
The empirical findings about levels and shapes of the average
earnings profiles in the different schooling groups imply the follow-
ing intergroup differentials in earnings:
1. Dollar differentials among schooling groups increase with ex-
perience. Because the earnings profiles are concave, the increase is
much more pronounced with age.
2. Relative intergroup differentials in annual earnings grow with
age, but diminish with experience. Weekly and hourly relative wage
differentials among schooling groups do not perceptibly change with
experience. Given a sufficiently small decline in differentials by ex-
perience, the increase by age is due to a strong logarithmic concavity
of the earnings profiles. As already explained, concavity of earnings
reflects diminishing investments over the working life.
The intergroup differentials account for only a part of the total
inequality (variance) among individuals within age or experience
groups intragroup dispersion—ditterentiats in earnings among mdi-
9. See Becker (1967, Part I, Chap. 1), and Ben-Porath (1968).76 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
viduals of the same schooling and age—is the other component of
the variance. Because both components of inequality are large, we
cannot explain variances in age or schooling subgroups without a
prior analysis of ungrouped, individual data.'°
Before we proceed to an econometric analysis of earnings pro-
files,it will be useful to consider somewhat more closely two im-
portant qualifications to the investment interpretation of earnings
profiles: (1) The allocation of investment over the life cycle cannot
be simply "read into" the cross-sectional profiles, which represent
earnings differences among distinct individuals who differ by age.
Though they had the same years of schooling, the different cohorts
may have had different patterns of post-school experience.1' (2) The
life-cycle earnings profile partly reflects biopsychological develop-
ment: of maturation at young ages and decline at older ages. This
development is systematic and largely independent of (exogenous to)
the individual's will. To the extent that this development creates a
concave earnings profile, the investment interpretation must be
modified.
Granted the validity of these qualifications in principle, their
weight remains to be settled on empirical grounds: (1) How different
are cohort earnings profiles from cross-sectional profiles in the same
schooling groups, abstracting from economywide fluctuations and
secular trends? (2) How important are the "inherent" age effects in
the observed earnings profiles? Empirical evidence is needed to indi-
cate whether we are dealing with major objections or minor qualifica-
tions. Scanty though it is, some evidence on the matter is available,
and it bears consideration:
1. In a study based on annual income data of the Current Popu-
lation Survey, H. P. Miller calculated average annual age-income
profiles of U.S. men in each of the several schooling groups for
10. In my analysis of 1950 data (Mincer, 1957, 1958), variances in age and school-
ing groups were explained only in terms of intergroup differentials observed in typical
earnings profiles. No contradiction arises in dollar variances, but the structure of rela-
tive variances is more intricate, as will be shown.
11.It should be clear, however, that even if major problems were to be posed by
the differences between cohorts and cross sections and between 'autonomous" and
investment-induced components of earnings profiles, they do not represent argu-
ments against a human capital analysis. When better understood, these phenomena
can and will be incorporated into the human capital models.AGE AND EXPERIENCE PROFILES OF EARNINGS 77
1956—66. Cohort changes in income can be calculated from these
data by comparing pairs of cross sections. Individuals in a given
schooling group who were 25 years in 1956 were 35 in 1966. In
Chart 4.6, the percentage rate of growth of their income in this
period is the ordinate of the upper (solid) line corresponding to age
25 on the horizontal scale, while the ordinate of the lower (broken)
line at this point shows the growth rate from age 25 to 35 in the 1956
cross section.12
The upper and lower lines are similar in shape, i.e., cohort pro-
files are similar in shape to the cross sections. They are displaced up-
ward by some 20—30 per cent per decade in most schooling groups
and ages, that is, actual growth of income was that much greater in
each cohort than in the cross section —a common effect of economy-
wide secular growth.
Table 4.3 shows the vertical displacement of the cohort from the
cross-sectional profiles at selected ages in the several schooling
groups. The variation in these numbers may reflect "non-neutrality"
in income growth, in favor of more educated and younger males, or
it may represent a relative understatement in the cross section
of the cohort post-school investments of these groups. Whichever
the correct interpretation may be, the concavity of logarithmic pro-
filesis evident in cohorts. Indeed, the suggested non-neutrality
would result in more pronounced concavity in the cohort than in the
cross section and a greater divergence of profiles with advancing
age.
2. Studies of 1964 and 1966 earnings of economists and a com-
panion study of 1966 earnings of all full-time employed persons re-
ported to the National Register of Scientific and Technical Per-
sonnel 13 included data on years of professional work experience in
addition to six other characteristics: age, years of schooling, pro-
fession, type of employer, work activity, and sex.
Economists of the same years of schooling and age had a con-
siderable dispersion of years of work experience: About 20 per cent
12. The years 1956 and 1966 were chosen because of their similar cyclical posi-
tions. The use of income rather than earnings is a minor drawback.
13. The 1964 study is reported in Tolles et al. (1965). The studies are based on over
10,000 reports from economists, and over 200,000 reports from all personnel in the
Register. The very informative multivariate statistical analysis of the data was de-
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NOTE: Figures on curves indicate years of schooling completed.
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census (August 1968, Table 11).AGE AND EXPERIENCE PROFILES OF EARNINGS 79
TABLE 4.3
ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF INCOME OF MEN IN SELECTED AGE
AND SCHOOLING GROUPS, 1956—66




1956 8 8 9—11 12 13—15 More
25 3.2% 2.2% 2.4% 2.7% 3.5% 4.0%
30 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.4 3.0 3.1
35 2.2 2.1 2.6 2.3 3.1 2.2
40 2.2 2.1 2.7 2.3 2.4 1.7
45 1.8 1.8 2.8 2.0 1.9 2.1
50 1.4 1.8 2.8 1.6 1.7 2.5
SouRcE: U.S. Census (1968, Table 11).
of persons in the same five-year age interval differed by more than 10
years of work experience (Tolles et al., 1965, Table 7, p. 40). This
variability and the large sample sizes permitted a statistically signifi-
cant separation of the effects of age and of experience on earnings.
Correlation of log earnings of economists with years of experience
yielded an A2 of .41; correlation with years of age yielded A2 = .23.
For all scientists, the simple coefficient of determination of earnings
with experience was .34; with age, it was .24. In the multiple regres-
sions on the seven characteristics, length of professional experience
and schooling (measured by highest degree) were the two most
powerful, and age was the least important, variable (Tolles and
Melichar, 1968, Table 11-2, p. 60; and Tolles et al., 1965, p. 64).
The studies showed that for economists under the age of 35, five
additional years of age provided a $300—$400 advantage, given the
same length of experience, while an additional five years of expe-
rience were associated with a gain of $1,500—$2,000, given the same
age (Tolles et al., 1965, p. 42). If so, the net age effect is about 20 per
cent of the combined effect of age and experience on earnings at the
younger ages. The net incremental value (partial regression coeffi-
cient) of years of experience declined as length of service increased,
but the increments remained positive throughout the observed work-
ing lives (Tolles et al., 1965, pp. 43, 49, 50).80 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The partial regression coefficient of age showed a decelerating
progression of salary with age which continued to about age 50, and
then became negative, that is, a net decline was associated with ad-
vancing age (Tolles et al., 1965, p. 70). Compared to the gross effect,
the net effect of age was quite small, but the net effect of experience
was almost as large as the gross effect (Tolles et al., 1965, Figure 1,
pp. 66—67).
The findings for all scientific professions are similar to those for
economists. The observed experience profiles of earnings differ a
great deal among specialities, type of employer, and type of work
activity. These differences can be attributed to the differential
effects of experience.
If we interpret the contribution of years of experience as invest-
ment-induced effects on earnings, and the contribution of age as the
"inherent" effects of biopsychological individual development, the
quantitative evidence of the AEA studies strongly supports the inter-
pretation of observed earnings profiles in terms of investment in
human capital.
Itis important to note, however, that the "age effect," small
though it is, contributes to the concavity of the observed earnings
profiles. If ignored, as it is perforce in the current study, investment
is overstated somewhat (20 per cent was suggested above) at ages
below 35, though understated later.14
Even if experience is shown to be a much more powerful deter-
minant of earnings than age, nevertheless an objection to the invest-
ment interpretation of the earnings profile could be made on the
ground that the growth of earnings with experience may reflect the
prevalence of institutional arrangements such as seniority provisions
in employment practices. Such practices, however, do not contradict
the productivity-augmenting investment hypothesis, unless it can be
shown that growth of earnings under seniority provisions is largely
independent of productivity growth.'5
A recent BLS study, Seniority in Promotion and Transfer Pro vi-
sions, makes clear that this is not the case. The study is based on
an examination of virtually all major collective bargaining agree-
ments (1,851 in all), each covering 1,000 workers or more (exclusive
14. This is comparable to the conclusions reached on the basis of Table 4.2.
15. In this study, productivity growth is not assumed to be costless.AGE AND EXPERIENCE PROFILES OF EARNINGS 81
of railroads, airlines, and government). The majority of the agree-
ments, covering over 70 per cent of workers subject to the agree-
ments, contain specific provisions for promotions. The absence of
such provisions is typical of industries with one or more of the follow-
ing characteristics:(1) Sharply differentiated skills and upward
movement to journeyman status through apprenticeship; (2) labor
agreements where no promotion is possible within the bargaining
unit; and (3) relatively high enterprise mortality, emplàyeeturn-
over, or sporadic or seasonal employment (Seniority, p. 3). Promotion
based only on seniority occurred in agreements covering less than 2
per cent of workers (Seniority, p. 5). In all other cases seniority was
considered jointly with merit,skill, aptitude, and other factors.
Seniority was cited as a principal factor in agreements covering 20
per cent of the workers. However, in agreements covering 50 per cent
of the workers, seniority applied only if other qualifying factors were
the same among the employees being considered for promotion. A
typical clause is:
When a vacancy occurs in one of the higher rate crafts, employees with
seniority shall be given full consideration before an appointment is made;
however, seniority shall not be the governing factor and shall not prevent
the transfer or appointment of an employee with less seniority, whose
ability and qualifications are greater than those of the senior employee
under consideration for the work on the higher paid job (Seniority, p. 6).
Seniority is more important as a factor in promotion of blue-
collar than of white-collar workers. It is least important in the profes-
sional, technical, sales, and supervisory categories of jobs. Skill and
ability are the principal nonseniority factors in agreements covering
about 75 per cent of the workers. Education is mentioned in only
about 7 per cent of the agreements as a factor in promotion.
In most of the agreements the employer is required to make
selections for promotion from the group of employees who had ex-
pressed an interest in the vacancy. In some agreements promotion is
restricted to specific employees in a line of progression, but such
"automatic" promotions are largely confined to smaller or narrower
job units—usually with a narrow occupational classification. A few
agreements call for tests to be administered to workers applying for
promotion. Many call for a (1—2 months) trial and training period on
the new job. Such a period allows the company to determine whether82 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
the employee can perform the job satisfactorily and gives the em-
ployee time to decide whether the job suits him. The bid for promo-
tion can be costly: disqualification during the probationary period is
considered in most of the agreements, and while in most of them
the disqualified worker is allowed to return to his previous job, in
some penalties are attached, such as some loss of seniority rights,
and even downward job transfers (Seniority, p. 31).
Long training periods following the promotion were in most in-
stances unnecessary, since employees covered by the provisions (un-
like those in formal training or apprenticeship programs) ordinarily
had acquired the necessary skills in lower-rated jobs, or were ad-
vanced through a series of semiskilled tasks requiring relatively little
training at each step. This situation is a vivid demonstration of the
processes of accumulation of human capital on the job.
In sum, it appears that productivity is a major criterion for promo-
tion in rules developed in collective bargaining. Moreover, the con-
finement of "automatic" promotion to narrow job classifications is
an indication that productivity growth looms larger the bigger the
job advancement.
The negligible role of school education in promotion is consis-
tent with the view that post-school productivity growth is causally re-
lated not to schooling but to post-school investments. This view was
supported by evidence (Table 3.4, above) of a declining correlation
between schooling and earnings as work experience accumulates.